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1. THE SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL BACKGROUND 
In May 1987 Malta undeI'Went one of the most tense periods of its 
recent history. In other democratic countries this may be simply de-
scribed as a change from one party in government to another following 
a general election. In this small Mediterranean island" however, the 
people have become obsessed with politics and politicians. A shift in 
government often signifies the loss for some and a gain for others of a val-
ued network of resource persons upon whom they can rely for assis-
tance or privilege when in need. In this micro-state, political battles 
carry a personalized more than an ideological flavour. For this main 
* Workers' PatPticipation Development Centre, University of Malta. 
1 Malta is an island state situated in the Central Mediterranean Sea, 
CIOvering an mea of 300 km' willth a P'OIPUlartion of 340,000 approx. A BrHish 
colony since 1800, Malta achieved pobirt'ical independence in 1964, though the 
island continued to serve as a milirtarry base 'l.lTItil 1979. 
Labour Force distribution ~aiS at April 1988) is aiS follow,s: 
Labour Supply = 127,388 of which 
Temporary Employees = 8,296 
Unemployed = 5,840 
Agriculture & Fisherties = 3,127 
Quarrying, Constructli'on & Oil DI1illing 4,799 
Private Manufactlll'ling = 28,000 
Public Manufaoturing = 5,161 
Private Market Services = 31,024 
Public Administration & Market Servlices = 35,370 
Malta has enjoyed a parliamentary democracy with universal suf-
frage since 1947. Since 1966 ,all Parliamentary seats have 'invariably been held 
by two parties. The Nationalist Pwty (NP), a cenbre-right party with a dem-
ochristian orien.rtation and ,the Malta Labour Party (MLP) a centreleft 
party W1ith a social democratlic orientartion. The NP [s now in Government 
with a 50.9% majoI1irt:y of votes. 
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reason the end of sixteen years of socialist rule was indeed a traumat-
ic experience for their followers while for their opponents, in the vic-
torious nationalist camp, it appeared like post-war liberation. Malta is a 
politically polarized society where politics penetrates almost every 
sphere of social, communal and inter-personal life. 
What may appear as even more strange to an outside observer is 
that in reality this small island-state is not divided by ethnic, religious 
or even wide class differences. On the face of it, the people appear to 
enjoy a relatively high standard of living. Indeed a recent Develop-
ment Plan has described Maltese society as "exceptionally homoge-
nous" without any "internal division or deep-rooted social conflicts 
(which) can give rise to tension and disrupt the gains of development"2. 
One way to understand this paradoxical situation is to visualize it as 
a state of normative dualism, as a by-product of colonial experiences 
stretching back over several centuries of Malta's social history.3 In oth-
er words, a traditional local culture has been overshadowed by an im-
ported value system which was superimposed by the colonial power 
holders. 
This has resulted in two sets of compeLing values and norms but 
for the most part confined to special areas of influence: The tradition-
al value system was mainly confined to the villages, religion and oth-
er 'localities' whereas the colonial domain was centred on the towns 
and concentrated on national, political, strntcgic and economic issues. 
Politics and decision-making were thus carried out for a long time on 
two levels which were hardly inter-related. The 'local' areas were domi-
nated by the Church while the 'national' areas were unconditionally 
surrendered to the foreign, colonial representatives. Thus while tradi-
tionally most Maltese passionately identified with their own locality 
represented by the village church, they were generally alienated from 
central government. Here they resorted to a number of social adapta-
tions or responces which reflected their powerlessness. Many of these 
behaviour patterns are still evident today and profoundly influence 
participatory developments. They include: 
(a) A 'paternalistic' expectation from those in positions of autho-
rity including Government ministers and those in managerial positions. 
(b) A widespread resort to 'patronage' networks on a personal, in-
formal level which serves as a manipulation of power. One notes that 
this militates both against 'paternalism' (above) and against a develop-
ment of collective action such as resulting from trade unionism (be-
low). 
(c) The failure of both 'paternalism' and 'patronage' to satisfy 
needs and expectations have resulted in periodic, popular outbursts 
from those who were left behind and felt relatively deprived. Such out-
bursts were generally directed by local leaders inspired by ideas and 
ideologies generally imported from abroad as a result of the frequent 
exchanges and traffic with other countries. In the early post-war pe-
riod, these protests, have tended to be channelled through the Malta 
2 Office of the Prime Minister (1981, p. 68) 
3 Zammit, E. L. (1984) 
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Labour Movement (MLM) - an alliance composed of the Malta Labour 
Party (MLP) and the General Workers' Union (GWU). 
(d) A pragmatic approach to life concentrating on the solution of 
day-to-day problems and a tendency to shy away from theories and 
ideologies. This is particularly evident in the Maltese approach to work-
ers' participation which is promoted mainly as a peaceful, practical 
solution to industrial problems. On the local level there has been over 
the years a heavy investment in the physical embellishment of the par-
ish churches as a source of pride and rivalry with the surrounding vil-
lages, and the locality provided the psychological defence of the Maltese 
against the national, foreign-dominated government. 
In recent years, however, there has been a marked shift away 
from locally-based institutions and organizations towards national centres. 
This process has proceeded apace with industrialization, improved 
communications and generally higher living standards. The increasing 
role of the state and the dominance of central political power has pro-
ceeded apace with de-colonization. And a corollary to this is also true: 
as the Maltese politicians came to assume full responsibility for their 
people's destiny, there was a relative breakdown of local defensive bar-
riers and all attention became focused on 'national' issues.4 To a large 
extent this explains the current popular preoccupation with politics 
and the excitement at election time. It also explains as will be argued 
later on, how issues relating to workers' participation at the enterprise 
level - such as one involving the election of a worker director - may 
quickly develop - via a network of personal inter-actions - into a 
major confrontation at the national level, as faced the present Govern-
ment and the GWU. It further explains the strategy adopted by the for-
mer Labour Government over a sixteen year period through which it 
managed to implement some drastic economic and social policies. Of-
ten these policies not merely infringed upon the traditional privileges 
enjoyed by certain social classes but also significantly challenged many 
of the traditional values established throughout Maltese society. Typi-
cally workers' participation - if implemented as an alternative policy 
for Malta's social and economic development - challenges the estab-
lished managerial prerogatives as well as the traditional perception of 
authority and its underlying system of values. 
n. THE WORKER DIRECTOR - A NEW STAR IN THE 
FIRMAMENT? 
That there is a keen interest by Maltese political parties, trade 
unions and employers on the whole question of workers' participation 
is understandable. Malta is a developing micro-state with no natural 
mineral resources. Apart from the sun and the sea, it depends on the 
resourcefulness and productivity of its labour force for economic sur-
vival. Malta's labour topography resembles that of industrialized states, 
having a negligible agricultural segment and a substantial indus-
4 Boissevain, J. (1965) 
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trial and service oriented working class which is highly unionized. Thus, 
while labour is the one main, readily available source of wealth creation, 
it is a very significant force, both at the ballot box and behind the union 
banner. All post-independence Maltese governments have sought, out 
of desire or sheer necessity, to control Maltese labour but !Without coer-
cive means and without undue exposure to the whims of market for-
ces: Nationalistic appeals, state-union collaboration; prices and incomes 
policy and widespread employment in the public sector can all be 
understood in this light as viable means of labour control which do 
not generate resistance and resentment, easily translated into industrial 
action and/ or electoral defeat. oFrms of workers' participation may sim-
ilarly be seen as a form of non-coercive labour control, albeit with 
a potential for a further democratization of power relations at the 
workplace. 
It was the Labour Party in government which ushered in experi-
ments with forms of worker participation. The first wave was narrow 
but deep: West German style co-determination was followed by a form 
of self-management at Malta Drydocks, a ship repair firm with the 
largest and, traditionally the most militant, workforce on the island. 
Industrial peace and profits were indeed secured but, since 1982, the 
Drydocks has continued to accumulate a substantial overdraft. Non-
profitability (even if to a small or large degree due to an international 
recession) and an autonomous public corporation beyond strict minis-
terial accountability have put a brake on self-management initiatives: 
Although never publicly admitted, it seems that from both a public and 
private point of view, the "experiment" had gone too far. 
The second wave of participative developments was broader but 
shallow: A spate of management committees were introduced in 1977 
in parastatal enterprises, public corporations and a number of govern-
ment departments. Suddenly, almost a quarter of the Maltese labour 
force was involved in some form of participatory management. The 
momentum of change was however soon halted: Many parastatal firms 
had to revert to more traditional forms of management once they were 
sold, in part or in full, to private capital. Inter-union (General Work-
ers' Union versus Confederation of Malta Trade Unions) rivalry in the 
public service led to "abuses" by worker representatives on manage-
rial/ministerial prerogatives and sealed the 'de facto' demise of man-
agement committees there. What survived was a number of union ap-
pointed worker directors . 
The worker director is the new star in the firmament, a new breed 
of animal which has very recently evolved in the Maltese labour rela-
tions scene. The evolutionary path appears in hindsight to have been 
a haphazard, impromptu series of events, lacking a definite strategy by 
Government, union, party or employer. In fact, unlike most other 
countries where worker directors exist, the Maltese counterparts do not 
owe their origin to a specific piece of legislation. The series of events 
was however definitely incremental and as the number of worker di-
rectors increased, this served to arouse a definite consciousness not 
only of their existence but also of their potential influence on corporate 
policy, union power and worker access to information. At the same 
time, the lack of clear legal guidelines on various issues concerning the 
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worker director is indicative of the unobtrusive, subdued nature of the 
filtration which characterized developments in this field of worker par-
ticipation over almost two decades.5 
The worker director issue however exploded with full force im-
mediately after the Nationalist Party (NP) was elected to power in May 
1987. Indeed an open debate concerning worker participation and in-
dustrial democracy erupted in the context of a confrontation between 
the newly elected government, barely a month in power, and the GWU, 
Malta's largest trade union with 36,000 members (60% of the unionized 
labour force and lout of every 3 gainfully occupied persons) the latter 
in open coalition with the Malta Labour Party (MLP) back on the Oppo-
sition benches. This particular episode is interesting to analyse because, 
in the throes of conflict, policy statements and directions are more li-
kely to be formulated and to be divulged in the inevitable skirmishes 
reported extensively in the m ass media.6 
This episode, though r esolved within a few weeks, served to make 
the Maltese public aware of this new, rather unknown feature in their 
midst: Not only was the worker director like a new star in the firma-
ment; it was also a star which enjoyed exceptional, universal popularity. 
Government, Opposition and Trade Unions seized the opportunity and 
tussled for pride of place as the champions of industrial democracy. 
The Nationalist Party, was perhaps anxious to give proof of its docu-
mented pre-election promise to support workers' participation in manage-
ment and liberalize further the existing forms of board representa-
tion by placing the post of worker director under the dictate of an open 
franchise and not determined merely by a trade union nomination. The 
GWU, disconcerted with the electoral defeat of its social democratic 
partner, was keen to bolster morale by a strong show of support for 
its sponsored candidates in the contest for election as worker directors . 
Even the CMTU, hitherto somewhat of an outsider in this matter, came 
out very strongly in favour of elected worker directors having full pow-
ers and responsibilities on the board. This all-round support for the 
worker director surfaced recently during the presentation of the 'Work-
er of the Year Award' - a prestigious event which was organized on 
a national basis for the first time in May 1988 which, by sheer coinci-
dence, served as a eulogy of the worker director: The keynote address, 
delivered by the WPDC, dwelt on the subject; the coveted award was 
won by the one nominated worker director; bringing the event to a close, 
the Prime Minister reaffirmed the NP's commitment to evolve industrial 
democracy further. The employers and their representatives appear to 
be the exceptions to this general wave of support and acclaim, decidedly 
caught on the wrong foot: They have always insisted, and still continue 
to insist, on a cautious approach to such a matter, since it merits se-
rious, meticulous study. Unfortunately for them, the spate of sudden 
development may have served to pull the carpet from under their feet 
and is likely to force from them a more definite policy standpoint in the 
near future. 
5 See Chronology of Events ~n Appendix I 
6 See the Revliew of Events concerning this debate in Appendix II 
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Finally, concurrent with these events, a Federation of Worker Di-
rectors (FWD) was set up in February 1988 to further institutionalize 
and coordinate the activities of worker directors. Its primary goals are 
those of "promoting industrial democracy at the workplace and to COll-
bat those forces which are threatening it."7 
The Statute of the FWD dwells exclusively on the promotion of 
workplace democracy and is couched in conciliatory terms. However, 
the press statements of the Federation have so far been less concilia-
tory and have vehemently exposed "reactionary threats" which are 
seeking to undermine worker participation. 
It is worthwile examining in some detail what these "threats" really 
are: They issue mainly from two camps: One concerns Malta Drydocks 
where a report by the enterprise's senior staff, has advocated 
sweeping structural reforms in the company's management, including 
the scrapping of workers' committees and introducing managerial cum 
financial institutions' representatives on the Council. The report is in 
itself indicative of an uneasy bedfellow relationship between tradition-
al and participatory management bodies. Rather than "an all-out attack 
aimed at destroying the unique self-management system", the report is 
rather a lament for better integration. A recent opinion survey in fact 
confirms that the vast majority of professional managers at the Dry-
docks are keen to develop further the participatory systern and to main-
tain a Council consisting of elected workers.8 All the same, the "threat" 
has been defused by the Prime Minister who pledged not to undermine 
the democratic nature of the enterprise's management. 
The second series of threats includes 
(a) Hindranc~ of a worker director in carrying out his duties 
(b) Indifference of the Government's Cooperatives Board towards 
the two worker cooperatives which are owned and run by their 
own workers 
(c) Disapproval of a worker director gaining access to personnel files 
(d) A worker director threatened with dismissal following a man-
agement charge. 
Such episodes could indeed be interpreted a sthreats, if the gener-
al atmosphere concerning workers' participation were one of persecution 
and undermining. It would not make sense to rally the fort if there 
were no enemy outside. The belligerent attitude is more understandable 
from a partisan political perspective: the Federation of Worker Direc-
tors, exclusively made up of GWU-MLP activists, may be politicizing it-
self unnecessarily and might itself sabotage the worker director process 
by forcing it to adopt a partisan flavour. Such a stand, one may argue, 
would serve only to cultivate antagonism and "worker-directorism" -
and would lose the national respect and esteem the movement has man-
aged to build to date. 
There seems to be no reason to force a pitched battle, least of all 
from the FWD, which has all to lose and nothing to gain. These same 
7 See a summary of the Statute of 'the FWD in Appendix III 
8 Workers' Participation Development Centre (1988) Survey of Percep-
tions of Council, Management, Workers' Committees and Shop Stewards at 
Malta Drydocks: The report is iIl1 the process of oompletion. 
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episodes, rather than "threats" could be seen as strong indications of 
the role vacuum which exists concerning the matter; a question of nor-
mative ambiguity, of anomie. 
Ill. A LEGAL ANOMALY 
International research has confirmed time and again the need for 
an adequate legal machinery for the effectiveness of workers' participa-
tion.9 Where this is lacking, there is scope for conflict where one side 
seeks to restrict and the other to widen the role jurisdiction. In the 
absence of any special provision in Maltese company law, a condition of 
normlessness is to be expected. The board of directors' main function 
is - and remains legally - the protection of shareholders' and credi-
tors' interests, and such a role is expected from all board members, 
including worker directors. A rather different situation may of course 
prevail in practice, where worker directors may perceive themselves as 
the protectors of worker interests and would therefore seek to pursue 
policies of a somewhat different flavour. This is fully understandable 
considering that worker directors are generally elected by the respective 
workforce, have a trade union background and are elected with trade 
union backing. In many cases, they are or have been the instruments not 
of worlcers' participation directly but of union participation; being either 
elected via a block vote of a specific union's membership or outrightly 
nominated by the trade union representing the majority of the workers 
in the respective enterprise. 
This ambiguity or confusion in ,what should be the exact role, pow-
ers and responsibilities of the worker director is not so easily resolved. 
The following salient questions come immediately to mind: 
(1) Are worker directors prepared to accept personal responsibility 
for past failures and breaches of duty by themselves or their 
predecessors? 
(2) Are worker directors, elected by "highly policized employees" 
(2) Are worker directors, elected by "highly politicized employees" 
to be trusted with maintaining secret the proceedings of the 
board and indeed, with complying with the board's majority 
decisions? 
(3) Where and under what procedures can a worker director re-
quire or need to see files, books of account or other documents, 
including those relating to personnel matters? 
(4) How often and under what procedures can a worker director 
visit factories, sites or branches and communicate with em-
ployees or customers? 
From the legal point of view, -worker directors in Malta are presently 
seen as no different from any other director. Therefore such a legal 
status should make clear that the responsibilities of a worker director 
(with regards to breaches of duty, for example) are the same as for 
other board members. Similarly, worker directors are expected NOT to 
9 See Interna1lional Research Group (1981) and Poole (1986) 
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divulge board proceedings and not to have personal access to company 
documents except as delegated by the board as a whole. Visits to bran-
ches, communication with employees and customers and other functions 
are not expressly prohibited by law and any director is presumably 
entitled to such activities. Obviously, it would also follow that, were a 
worker director to breach his functions and duties, or act beyond his 
power, he is liable to criminal proceedings, like any other diector. 
This legal scenario would appear to dismiss any scope for anomie 
among worker directors, yet the anomie exists because worker direc-
tors do not consider themselves as just directors. They feel that their 
status is a unique one and should always include a championing of spe-
cific worker interests, although not to the exclusion of the company's 
interests. Rather than considering themselves as representing traditional 
shareholders, the predominant feeling is that a worker director repre-
sents those who have invested effort, time, energy and career in the 
same company. Such an attitude - which finds no support in law -
has the effect of reproducing the capital-labour dichotomy so common 
in traditional industrial relations - nurtured in the classical British 
style - on the board of directors. Such an attitude also legitimizes the 
paramount concern for workers' interests (as against other matters) by 
the worker director in his dealings on the board. 
These and other perceptions of worker directors have been forthcom-
ing from a postal questionnaire conducted in February 1988.10 All 
those who, until December 1987, had served as worker directors were 
requested to comment on a series of general statements highlighting 
both the advantages and disadvantages of the single worker director on 
the Board. (Drydocks Council members were excluded from this pop-
ulation because there the complete board is worker elected - the 
problems which emerge are somewhat specific and not comparable). 
Eleven respondents thus made up the total population of worker 
directors at that point in time. Of these, nine sent their comments and 
opinions, written in a personal capacity. 
All respondents felt that a worker director on the board is an im-
portant, positive development, in workplace democratisation. Contrary 
to the present legal standing, however, the worker director is consid-
ered to be a workers' representative on the board. Therefore, the worker 
director has the special responsibility of improving labour-management 
relations, promoting understanding and cooperation at work; appealing 
for higher labour productivity and channelling certain items of infor-
mation to workers. 
The anomic situation that the worker directors find themselves in 
emerges from their identification of problems concerning their office: 
They must always keep their workers' interests foremost on their agen-
da, but these must be reconciled in some way with the interests of the 
company; the worker director must follow an uncharted course - be-
tween a glorified shop steward and a traditional director; the worker 
director must be able to contribute to deliberations and discussions on 
company poliCy without jeopardising his 'aloofness' from the other 
10 Reported in WPDC Newsletter Perspettivi, Issue No. 3, 1988. 
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directors: Otherwise, he would be courting disaster in identifying him-
self too much with the other directors; the worker director is powerless 
without trade union support but then he is not a union spokesman; the 
worker director must operate beyond a strict oppositional stance but 
must remain wary of unconditional collaboration which may be used 
against workers' interests.ll 
IV. GUIDELINES FOR ACTION 
What, therefore, is to be done? The worker directors themselves 
suggest the following series of developments: 
1. Education programmes for all parties concerned -workers, uni-
on stewards, managers, directors - which should help not only in-
struct individuals into their own role but also to appreciate those of 
others.12 
2. The setting up of official terms of reference on what exactly are 
the functions, rights, duties and responsibilities of the worker direc-
tor.J3 
3. To increase the number of worker directors on each board. This 
would certainly reduce the aggressive, defensive stance most worker 
directors adopt as a natural reaction to their "isolation". 
4. To encourage workers to vote for worker directors who are ca-
pable and responsible, and not merely those who happen to carry a 
trade union or political party blessing. 
5. Non-worker directors are not to look upon the worker director as 
if he is already guilty of a premeditated crime [For exarnple withhold-
ing information from him because he is expected to breach his duties 
and to divulge this information outside the board]. Like any other di-
rector, he should be given his fair opportunity of proving his integrity 
and only disciplined failing that. 
The WPDC, asked some months ago to provide its opinions on this 
matter, has put forward the following policy options: 
11 SUch problems have been documented also :in the caJSe of Worker 
Directors iin West Germany (ILO, 1981); Denmark (European Foundatlion 
1981) and Ireland {European Foundation, 1983). In the British Post Office 
experiment the Bullock 2 X + Y formula sUnlctured more clearly the worker 
directors' role as representative of wOI1ker and ll.lIl:ion mterests. Anomie was 
reduced at the cost of desUructive labour.;rnanagement confrontation (Bat-
stone, et. al. 1983). Worker Di:rectors on ,the board of the British Steel Cor-
poramon also mention their problematic role {Brannen, 1983 p. 135)). Both 
Kester & Schiphorst (1987, p. 34) and Fogarty (1972, IP. 3) think Hkewise, the 
latter suggesting new social accounting techniques based on net value added 
to take cognizance of new 'social objectives by the recomposed boards of 
directors. 
12 This was actually preempted in the case 'of the British Steel Corp. 
There; Worker Directors were sent on a five-week induction course - Bran-
[len (1983) 
13 Commenting on the European experience with worker directors, 
Poole (1986, p. 156) claims that " ... it would seem appropriate for medifi-
cations to be made in company law which would relieve the confusion of 
woI1k:ers Who participate in decisions at board level under current arrange-
ments". 
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(1) TWO-TIER BOARDS 
The proposal of the European Commission to have a two-tier board 
system for effective worker director schemes ought to be considered. 
The demarcation of responsibilities would ease the burden of the work-
er director and reduce conflicts of interest: 
"Such a system enables the employees to be integrated in the de-
cision-making process without affecting the homogeneity of management 
and its ability to react quickly to changing market situations. The em-
ployers' representatives will on the other hand not be put in a situation 
of permanent conflict of loyalty with regard to the employees which 
would otherwise be imminent if they were integrated in a board dealing 
with day to-day management".14 
(2) WORKS COUNCILS 
The absence of Works Councils at the place of work has made the 
transition to workers' participation schemes less smooth than expected. 
There is no tradition of effective, harmonious relations and consultative 
machinery. As a result more vociferous demands may be made by the 
workers once they are only granted token representation at the highest 
board level. 
(3) PARITY REPRESENTATION 
Workers' participation schemes have worked more successfully where 
parity of representation prevails. In this respect the proposal of the 
EEC Commision requires that "shareholders should elect one third of 
the members, the employees the second third, and that these elected 
members should together co-opt the remaining members, who are to be 
independent of both employees and shareholders and to represent the 
general in1erest".!s Selection criteria of the last mentioned board mem-
bers are 'necessary knowledge and experience'. This framework is 
geared at preventing a deadlock in reaching decisions. 
(4) DEFINITION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
The law needs to be more specific as to what the worker directors 
can and cannot do. The German co-determination law explicitly pro-
hibits the worker directors from mobilising the workers. However, for 
these worker directors to be truly representative, they need to maintain 
ongoing links with the workers both formally and in practice. Towards 
this end, in France, an Act of July 1983 stipulates that the worker di-
14 European Commission - Green Paper of 13th May 1975. Text is 
available in Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations No. 8, 1977, Deven-
ter. Kluwer Publishing. 
15 Ibid. 
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rector's "time off for his board representation and related activities 
may not be less than 15 hours a month or more than half of the nor-
mal working time"16 
(5) EDUCATION FOR PARTICIPATION 
It has to be emphasized that the introduction of workers' participation 
schemes in various European countries has been accompanied by pro· 
fessional, systematic and intensive programmes of training to workers' 
representatives, managers, and to shareholder representatives on boards. 
To be most effective, such educational provision should seek to be par-
ticipatory in form as well. 
(6) OPENNESS AND TRUST 
No attempt should be made by the other directors to restrict the 
influence of worker directors by making 'official' board meetings as 
brief and rare as possible, by side stepping personnel issues which are 
felt to be of major interest to worker directors or by appointing steering 
committees in a deliberate effort to bypass or overrule the worker direc-
tors. Such manipulations foment mistrust and are self-defeating in the 
long run. 
(7) A PARTICIPATION MODEL 
The Maltese Government's declared intention to seek full mem· 
bership of the EEC appears more credible if local developments in 
workers' participation approximate as much as possible to the uniform 
system proposed by the European Parliament. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The development of the worker director, both as an institution and 
as a culturally acceptable novelty, has been slow but steady and, there-
fore, appears all the more durable and naturalized in the Maltese en-
vironment. In the contemporary atmosphere, however, the process is 
consolidating its general acceptability while seriously facing, perhaps 
for the first time, the pains of legal and functional accommodation: To 
whom is the ultimate allegiance of the worker director? To what degree 
16 Monat (1984, p. 61) 
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is the worker director different from any other director? Whom is he 
representing? What should be his position in the throes of an industrial 
dispute? What relationship should he maintain with the trade union(s) 
represented at his place of work? 
The worker director is a hybrid newcomer to Maltese labour re-
lations but the socio-political climate in which he operated never forced 
a confrontation with the stark reality of an anomalous and anomic con-
dition. Today, this self-evaluation is forced upon the worker director by 
the sudden spate of popularity, national respectability and not least by 
the change in government and the inevitable consequent realignment 
of state, party, union and employer relations. The outcome has included 
an institutional establishment, sporadic outbursts in the press and a 
number of tentative policy options, some by the worker directors them-
selves. This situation calls for a happy resolution, unless the worker 
director concept degenerates into a partisan battlecry or a victim of its 
maturation crisis. There is indeed a new star in the firmament; but the 
(star) maps have still to be edited. 
The question whether the worker-director scheme is likely to spear-
head a new thrust to the development of worker participation in Malta 
is difficult to answer. It has been argued that the general cultural con-
text is not conducive to the development of participatory values. The 
traditional emphasis on a paternalistic role for those in authority and 
the prevalence of patronage ne1Jworks operate clearly against that. The 
contemporary breakdown of whatever local-religious-communal tend-
encies prevailed in the past and the emergence of a nationally polarized, 
competitive, materialistic, and individualistic tendency create further 
difficulties for participation. 
On the other hand, the general interest in 'making participation 
work' on the part of all the main social, political and economic forces 
may create scope for experimentation even if these strange bedfellows 
may have conflicting long-term aims and interests. 
In the long run, however, given that workers' participation has to 
do with the exercise of power within enterprises and in society at large, 
it is likely, that the main source of workers' power - the trade union 
- which has promoted, supported and hitherto maintained self-man-
agement at Malta Drydocks in spite of economic adversity and political 
pressures - may again come to the rescue. Traditionally, of course, trade 
unions have exercised power in the workplace of an oppositional type 
through collective bargaining and in this way they have had a signifi-
cant impact on working conditions. Yet, during times of economic re-
cession and particularly in situations of development the traditional role 
becomes severely restricted. In order to be effective, union power has 
to be used wisely, sparingly and responsibly. As Poole has recently ar-
gued "it is precisely by augmenting the latent and oppositional power 
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of workers ... that progress can be made towards the establishment of 
workers' participation in decision making at every level".17 
In this perspective, bargaining and participation emerge as only 
different points on a scale for the exercise of the same union power 
for the achievement of the same, ultimate goals. 
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APPENDIX I 
The Worker Direotor in Malta: A Chronology of Events 
YEAR FIRM OWNERSHIP EVENT 
STATUS 
1970 Union Press union owned 2 worker directors 
elected 
1971 Malta Drydocks public corporation Co-Determination -
3 worker directors 
appointed by GWU 
(half the board) 
1973 National Cargo union owned 4 worker directors 
Handling appointed by GWU 
Company (half the board) 
1974 Hotel Villa private ownership 2 \vorker directors 
Rosa elected 
1976 B. I. M. " 1 worker director 
elected 
1983 Bank of Govt. majority 1 worker director 
Valletta shareholding elected 
1984 TelemaIta public corporation 1 worker director 
nominated by GWU 
1985 Enemalta 1 worker director 
nominated by GWU 
1985 Marsa Govt. majority 1 worker director 
Shipbuilding shareholding nominated by GWU 
1985 Marsa " 1 worker director 
Shipbuilding elected 
1986 Construction parastatal company 1 worker director 
& General elected 
Engineering 
1986 Tug Malta parastatal company 1 worker director 
elected 
1986 Magruvision parastatal company 1 worker director 
appointed 
1987 Air Malta public corporation 1 worker director 
nominated by GWU 
1988 Enemalta public corporation 1 worker director 
elected 
1988 Telemalta public corporation 1 worker director 
elected 
1988 Air Malta public corporation 1 worker director 
elected 
Note: The above chronology highlights 
(a) The momentum gained by (b) 
"worker-directorism" since 
1983, this form of participa-
tory management spreading 
to a number of large public 
/parastatal companies 
The shift from GWU-nomi-
nated to worker elected 
worker directors in publici 
parastatal bodies 
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APPENDIX II 
The Worker Director becomes a Matter of Confrontation between 








The New Nationalist Government is sworn into Office 
The Government announces the Board of Directors of Ene-
malta Corporation, excluding the GWU-nominated Worker 
Director 
The GWU files a judicial protest in the Civil Court on the 
grounds that the Union's right to nominate a representative 
on the Board of Directors of Enemalta Corporation has not 
been upheld. The GWU criticises the move as a breach of a 
collective agreement and as a threat to workers' participation. 
The Chairman of Enemalta Corporation and the Ministry 
for the Development of the Infrastructure reply in a coun-
ter-protest that the power to nominate the corporation's 
board is vested only in the Government. The Minister also 
informs the GWU that the Government intends reforming 
the law regulating the election of worker directors on the 
boards of parastatal corporations such that worker direc-
tors are truly worker representatives. 
The GWU's nominee on the Board of Telemalta Corpora-
tion is also not upheld. 
The GWU raises the issue at the 73rd session of the Inter-
national Labour Organization. 
Following protracted negotiations in which both the Acting 
President of the Republic of Malta and the Prime Minister 
were involved, the GWU accepts the principle that all work-
er directors be elected to the post. 
The Minister for Social Policy invites various bodies (includ-
ing the GWU, CMTU, and the WPDC) to table suggestions 
concerning the procedures of electing worker directors to 
the Boards of Telemalta and Enemalta. 
4/7 Goverment and the GWU reach an agreement on the issue; 
the Government pledges to enact immediate legislation con-
cerning the elections of worker director on the Board of 
Directors of Telemalta and Enemalta Corporations; the elec-
toral procedures are to be agreed upon by both GWU & 
Government. 
18/8 Government and the GWU do not agree as to the eligibility 
of union shop stewards and candidates who contested the 
last general elections for contesting the post of 'Worker di-
rector. 
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APPENDIX III 
The Federation of Worker Directors: Salient Aspects of its Statute 
The FWD was set up on 8th February 1988 with the following mem-
bers: The 8 elected members of the Council of Malta Drydocks, 2 work-
er/shareholders of 2 producer cooperatives, the worker directors on 
the Boards of B. 1. M., Bank of Valletta, Tug Malta, Telemalta, Ene-
malta, Marsa Shipbuilding and Construction and General Engineering. 
Articsle 2 Definition - A 'Worker Director' shall be understood as 
Article 3 
any director who is elected by workers to sit on the board 
of directors of the enterprise where they work for a defi-
nite time period. 
Aims (a) To increase cooperation and solidarity amon}! 
all worker directors 
(b) To extend workers' participation in enter-
prises and to assist in the establishment of 
new forms of participatory management 
(c) To enable worker directors to meet and ex-
change experiences such that workers' partic-
ipation can further develop. 
(d) To assist workers in enterprises where there 
is as yet no worker director, such that 
these workers will also have their represen-
tatives on the Board. 
(e) To assist in the expansion of the number of 
elected representatives where the right of 
representation already exists. 
Article 11 Political 
Autonomy 
While the Federation cannot interfere in any 
way in the activities of its individual mem-
bers, the Federation is autonomous of any 
political party. 
